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1Creativity has been approached and studied from many different 
viewpoints. A number of the studies in this area are conflicting, while 
others are only speculative. Still,^some of these discussions shed light 
on this very elusive variable. Collectively, these studies and discus­
sions of creativity suggest:
1) that the creative individual has some personality character­
istics, apart from intelligence per se, which allow him to make unusually 
good use of his native abilities in the solution of problems and in the 
living of every day life (Gardner, 196k, p. 22; c.f. also: Barron, 19&3; 
Maslow, 1959; May* 1959; Rogers, 1961);
2) that these characteristics may be of real significance to 
the individual and to society (Sears & Sherman, 196^);
3) that they are less restricted by the limits of inherited 
capacities than is raw intelligence and;
4 ) that they should be separated from intelligence (Ripple &
May, 1962).
Further evidence for the validity of the conceptual distinction 
between IQ and creativity is presented by Goodale (l970)* He reports two 
studies, one by Terman (195*0 and the other by Getzels and Jackson (1962), 
both of which demonstrate the separate influences of creativity and in­
telligence. These two studies, concludes Goodale, give support to teach­
ing methods which would foster and cultivate creativity in individuals 
while at the same time developing intelligence.
However, the separation of IQ and creativity is often not 
clearly made. From their review and empirical analysis of ;the literature 
on creativity, Wallach and Kogan (1965* Wallach (1968), and Wallach (1970)
2concluded that researchers and educators alike have failed to separate 
creativity as a distinct entity from intelligence. The authors cite 
.work by Cline, Richards and Abe (1962), Guilford (1956, 1959> 1963, 1967), 
Thorndike (1963), Torrance and Gowan (1963), and Torrance (1966) as ex­
amples of this failure to separate creativity and IQ. In addition to this, 
Wallach (1970, p. 1239) argues that great confusion related to the topic 
of creativity has een sown by the Getzels and Jackson research, and that 
their tests of creativity produce a composite socre which ’'constitutes a 
second - and less reliable - measure of general intelligence." Both 
Wodtke (196*0 and Harvey et. al. (1970) reach the same conclusion in re­
lation to Torrance’s tests of creativity and these authors express serious 
reservations concerning what Torrance asserts his test measure and what 
they found to be the actual case in their research.
In view of these considerations, Wallach and Kogan have pro­
posed that creativity be further investigated and have constructed the 
following assumptions to aid them in their research:
1) Creativity is most prevalent in a task-orientation context.
2) Creativity reveals itself in situations that are free of 
evaluation, coercion and time limits. A component of creativity is per­
missiveness and playfulness.
3) Creativity can be defined as an associational concept that 
focuses upon one’s ability to generate or produce associative content 
that is plentiful and that is unique, within a criterion of task relevance.
*4-) Creativity is a cohesive and unitary dimension of individual 
differences which is relatively distinct from the concept of general in­
telligence .
3The last two points differentiate Wallach and Kogan*s theory 
of creativity from, that theory which employs a cultural frame of reference 
and insists that a creative product must he novel to both the individual 
and to society and that, in addition, it must be useful. More specifical­
ly, according to Torrance (1962), who is the leading representative of 
this school of thought, in order to be called "creative", an activity 
must result in something that is culturally, as well as individually, 
novel and useful.
These four points also place Wallach and Kogan in that genre 
of thought which views and defines creativity within a personal or ex­
istential context, i.e., creativity involves novelty or uniqueness, but 
placed in a personal frame of reference. A product may be a creative 
one if it is new or novel to the individual involved, if it is his own 
creation, if it is expressive of him rather than dictated by someone else. 
Its social recognition and cultural impact may be zero, but if it is a 
unique personal experience, it is creative (Hampden-Turner, 1970; Maslow, 
1959; May, 1959> Rogers, 1961). A further expression of this existential 
philosophy.'is that mentioned' by-Telford and Sawrey' (.1972, p. 156) in 
their brief summary of a portion of Maslow*s theory which emphasizes 
that creativeness is a universal characteristic of individuals. Each 
individual has his own originality or inventiveness that has unique char­
acteristics. For Maslow and for others els well, the creativeness of the 
self-actualized individual is similar to the naive creativeness of un­
spoiled children. All persons are said to possess the potentiality for 
creativeness at birth, but most lose it as they become enculturatedS
Carl Rogers (1961, P« 350) defines creativity as a process
h"that is the emergence in action of a novel rela­
tional product, growing out of the uniqueness of 
the individual on the one hand, and the materials, 
events, people, or circumstances of his life on 
the other."
This definition is in accordance with that definition of creativity pre­
sented by Wallach and Kogan; however, Rogers carries the implications 
further by desiring to foster self-actualizing and self-actualization 
in an educational setting by focusing on the creative growth of the 
self and the synergic relationship of the individual with society (Drews, 
1968a, p. 97)*
As Rogers views it, self-actualization describes man Ts tendency 
or motivation for creativity - the directional trend which is evident in
i
all organic and human life: the urge to expand, extend, develop, and 
mature. Self-actualization is a process which tends to express and 
activate all the capacities of the organism or of the self (Rogers, 1961, 
p. 351)> sind in this sense what Rogers has to say about self-actualization 
is very similar to Mas low *s view of self-actualization.
Piaget describes this growth propensity as the "need" of the 
organism to cognize which, for Piaget, is an assimilatory activity whose 
essential nature is to function and then to perpetuate itself by more 
functioning. It is the very nature of assimilation that the organism 
develops schemas (structuring of the environment) which, once created, 
maintain themselves by assimilatory functioning (Flavell, 1963* PP# 78-80) 
For Piaget, assimilation is the dominant component of intelligence.
Rogers (1961, pp. 353-359) places what could be called facili- 
tors of self-actualization or encouragements of assimilation into three 
general areas:
51) Openness to Experience
2) An Internal Locus of Evaluation
3) The Ability to Toy with Elements and Concepts; "messing 
around" for Holt (1967) and "symbolic play*1 for Piaget (l970). 
Concomitantly - and this stems from the inner conditions of creativity - 
creativity cannot be forced, but must be permitted to emerge within 
contexts, that support the processes of:
A) Psychologica - Safety and
B) Psychological Freedom.
Rogers goes on to describe that the interpersonal interactions which take 
place within the context of Psychological Safety and Psychological Free­
dom possess the qualities of:
I) Acceptance of the Individual as a Possessor of Unconditional
Worth,
ii) a Climate in which External Evaluation is Absent, and
iii) Empathic Understanding.
In discussing his Origin-Pawn theory, DeCharms (1965, 19^8,
1969, 1972) employs many of the same terms in describing an individual
who is an Origin as Rogers does in'describing the attributes of a
fully-functioning, creative individual. DeCharms states that a man is
not a stone nor is he a machine; man is an Origin:
An Origin has a strong feeling of personal causation, 
a feeling that the locus for causation of effects in 
his environment lies within himself. The feedback 
that reinforces this feeling comes from changes in 
his environment that are attributed to personal be­
havior. This is the crux of the concept of personal 
causation and is a powerful motivational force dir- ,
ecting future behavior. A Pawn has a feeling that 
causal forces beyond his control, or personal 
forces residing in others, or in the physical
6environment determine his behavior. This constitutes 
a strong feeling of powerlessness or ineffectiveness.
(1968, p. 27k)
From this quote and from research to <be presented in the following pages, 
a sense of individual responsibility or of personal causation is the 
predominant characteristic of an individual who is considered an Origin. 
Along with this facet of personality also goes the characteristics of 
openness to experience and the capacity for and involvement with creative 
activity via the medium of play. In connection with this, DeCharms (1968) 
mentions that the environment must possess several processes or require­
ments if an individual is to develop into an Origin; such things as 
the presence of empathy, the communication of personal value and worth 
to others, and a fostering of the feeling of freedom compose the Origin- 
environment. As the readier can see, these are almost carbon copies of 
the processes noted by Rogers; however, their vocabulary and the research 
behind them are a little different.
A more detailed linking of the theories of Rogers and DeCharms 
will be presented over the next several pages. I am going to theoretical­
ly and empirically demonstrate a point-for-point correspondence between 
those designators of creativity emphasized by Rogers and those designa­
tors of Originness emphasized by DeCharms. With this in mind, it seems 
that the above definition of the 0-P variables closely parallels Rogers 1 
insistence for an Openness to Experience (l). This relationship is not 
directly based on what these two authors have stated, but rather the 
conceptual link is- made via the work of Rokeach (i960, p. 58) whose de­
scription of “openness” and of an “open-minded" individual resembles 
DeCharms1 description of Originness. Further, the association of An
7Internal Locus of Evaluation (2) and Psychological Freedom (B) to Origin­
ness can be demonstrated if one considers DeCharms * definition of 
personal causation and some re search * which he cites (DeCharms, 1965, p. 2*4-3) 
dealing with a study conducted by McClelland which found that individual 
responsibility (An Internal Locus of Evaluation) is not necessarily pre­
cluded in working for a group (school classroom) or an organization, as 
long as the individual can feel free (Psychological Freedom) to initiate 
action and make decisions contributing to group success.
Also the concept of playfulness has definitely influenced 
DeCharms* notion concerning the gestalt of an Origin. Says DeCharms,
"We must try to school ourselves in the discipline of 
conceiving of certain activities, even some that de­
mand great expenditure of energy, as sought for their 
own sake, as standing by themselves as desirable, 
without having to lean on the crutch of a desirable 
outcome. Play and games come closest to giving us 
the concept we need, and fun comes closest to de­
scribing the affective component... We have assumed 
that some behaviors are apparently done for their 
own sake, and that one class of behavior that ap­
pears to be done for its own sake is behavior re­
sulting from striving for personal causation, be­
havior that results in environmental change that is 
controlled by the actor. Of all possible behaviors 
that demonstrate a change effected by the actor, 
those will be preferred that result in maximum 
evidence of the effectiveness of the actor." (1968, pp. 327-328)
Earlier in his book, DeCharms (1968, p. 273) mentions that play that
is forced becomes work; if one could choose his work without regard to
external pressures and necessity, it would take on many of the aspects of
play because one of the major components of the distinction between work
and play is that work is something you do because you must while play is
something you do because you want to. And in discussing Gilbert Ryle’s
concept of motives and emotions, DeCharms (1968, p. 60) mentions that
8much of the so-called intrinsically motivated behavior which people 
have does not appear to be ’’driven’1 or even specifically "directed” by 
affective states. Examples crop-up most often in "free” situations of 
play or creative activity.
Such a position in relation to the importance of play definitely 
and positively facilitates the interrelation of this portion of DeCharms * 
theory with Rogers* Ability to Toy with Elements and Concepts (3) which 
necessitates, according to Rogers (1961, p. 355)> the ability to play 
spontaneously with ideas, colors, shapes, relationships - to juggle ele­
ments into impossible juxtapositions, to shape wild hypotheses, to make 
the given problematic, to express the ridiculous, to translate from one 
form to another, to transform into improbable equivalents. It is this
spontaneous toying and exploration, continues Rogers, that produces the 
hunch, the creative seeing of life in a new and significant way. It is
as though out of the wasteful spawning of thousands of possibilities there
emerges one or two evolutionary forms with the qualities which give them
more permanent value. T1
In addition to the foregoing, Liebermann (1965) found in a 
study with kindergarten children, that three measures of divergent think­
ing (ideational fluency, spontaneous flexibility, and originality) were 
significantly associated with measures of physical, social, and cognitive 
spontaneity, as well as with indexes of joy and humor. On a centroid 
factor analysis, the spontaneity, humor, and joy variables also comprised 
a primary factor which Liebermann labeled "playfulness”. Subsequently, 
she proposed the existence of a playfulness dimension in early life * 
which, according to her, is a precursor of adult creativity (Liebermann,1967).
However, Liebermann employed a Torrencian paridigm in her investigations, 
which does not negate her findings but it does make it more difficult to 
.relate her findings to this thesis. f
Recently, though, Singer and Rummo (1973) retested Liebermann *s 
hypotheses using a Wallach and Kogan-type measure of ideational creativity 
and a factor analysis confirmed Liebermann*s finding of a general play­
fulness dimension in creative children.
Next, it would seem that a relationship exists between DeCharms* 
finding (1965, p. 255) that an individual feels freer when working for 
an attractive agent than when working for an unattractive one and Rogers *
condition of acceptance of the individual as a possessor of Unconditional
}'
Worth (i). A child will work harder and get more out of what he is do­
ing if his endeavors hold some attraction for him, either because of the 
activity itself or the agent initating the activity. A study by Hastorf, 
Kite, Gross and Wolfe (1965) is related to this concept of a positive 
orientation (Origin-like) toward another individual. The authors concluded 
that behavior which was perceived as externally caused was not weighted 
as heavily in evaluation as behavior seen as internally caused. Further, 
it was found that when individuals "read” the locus of causality for a 
change in another’s behavior, the nature of this reading influenced the 
inferences made about that person. Unless one can attribute change to 
an internal cause, one is not likely to alter his impression of another. 
This finding has many implications for education, especially as it applies 
to the natural curiosity and existence of an intrinsic desire for assim­
ilation in children mentioned earlier. *
Kuperman (cited in DeCharms, 1968, pp. 3^3~3^7) found that
10
Origin cognition is greater and Pawn lesser in low-constraint conditions 
rather than in high constraint conditions. Thus, if one is to be con­
sistent, in order to foster an Origin behavior, one must provide a climate 
free of External, Competitive Evaluation (ii). And finally, Empathy (iii) 
is a concomitant of Originness in ..that empathic environments, seem . 
to foster Originness in interpersonal interactions and in hhah empathy / 
plays a large role in DeCharms1 construct of personal knowledge, which is 
necessary if the concept of personal causation is to develop in an in­
dividual .
My reasons for the prior theoretical and empirical linking of 
Rogers 1 view of creativity with DeCharms1 0-P variable center around the 
fact that if they are as close as they appear to each other in terms 
of tapping into common variables, then the measure of one could be employed 
to measure what the other measures and vice versa. However, to understand, 
more exactedly, what I am pursuing, the reader should keep in mind that 
to say that individuals are either absolute Origins or absolute Pawns in 
the dichotomous sense of the word is to imply a meaning and a distinction 
not intended by DeCharms. Plimpton (1968, p. 6) mentions that this would 
be rather unrealistic. Rather, in discussing Origin and Pawn, one must 
assert that these two concepts should be conceived as lying along a con­
tinuum, and in talking about everyday life, one has to recognize that 
an individual cannot be an Origin 100$ of the time for the simple reason 
that man lives in a complex social context and as such he is oftentimes 
subject to external forces "causing" him to act and to behave in certain 
normative ways. However, to say that an individual is an Origin or *to 
allow an individual to function as an Origin means that he is acting or
11
can act more often as though he is causing his own behavior rather than 
something external causing his behavior.
Thus, with respect to the education of children, viewing and 
treating a child as an Origin instead of a Pawn necessitates that one 
assume a nonauthoritarian approach (an Origin approach) to interpersonal 
relations, and recognize the intrinsic value the child places in himself, 
in his world as he perceives and understands, it. And on a two dimensional 
continuum, the Origin-like approach would be very similar to Lewin, Lippitt, 
and Whitefs (cited in Sampson, 1971, PP» 238-2^7) experimentally created 
democratic' group and the Pawn-like approach would be very similar to 
that taken in their experimentally created authoritarian group. I would 
expect that the results of this study would parallel those of Lewin,
Lippitt, and White and in fact Jackson (personal communication) has found 
that a child's 0-P score varies as a function of the type of setting he 
is involved in. Specifically, children from laissez-faire families scored 
lowest on the 0-P measure, children from the authoritarian families scored 
next lowest, and children from democratic families scored highest on the 
0-P variable.
In addition to this, authoritarian leaders, according to
Jackson and Sanders
‘'place the locus of control in themselves and tell 
the child that he is not capable of taking res­
ponsibility. Just the opposite is true of the laissez- 
faire leaders who allow the child to take res­
ponsibility for himself." The democratic leaders 
also "trust the child to take some responsibility 
for him (the leader). Obviously the democratic 
leadership pattern is more likely to encourage 
autonomy than the other two.” (l973> P» 251) 0
These two authors further assert that messages or communication which
comes from leaders (teachers) have import at levels other than what is
12
overtly demonstrated. The import is probably very influential and has 
a drastic impact on the child's autonomy. The amount of warmth or con­
cern expressed to the child affects/his autonomy as well.*
Hence on a control vs. interaction continuum what is found 
is that the former fosters the development or appearance of Pawn-like be­
havior if not a Pawnish personality, while the latter abets Origin behavior 
if not the establishment of an Origin personality by the reduction of 
control or, analogously, by the "dropping of the reins" (DeCharms, 1969, 
pp. 9-10). This finding is prevalent not only in research completed with 
groups and classrooms but it is also demonstrated in the literature on 
child rearing.** However, here it is important to remember that inter­
action with a child via an Origin-like approach implies a philosophy of 
education different from the one now currently in vogue; for in many 
schools and classrooms children are taught to consider only the "yes" 
answer as the right answer. They are looked upon as little adults directed 
into vying for grades on competitive exams because they are told that these 
ape the only measures of progress and success. Denied necessary and val­
uable symbolic freedom by the rigors of the class schedule, it is no 
wonder that so many children fail in school (Holt, 1964).
The indicator of classroom climate used in this study was 
the Indirect-Direct (I- D) ratio measured by the Amidon and Flanders Inter­
action Analysis (1963)* The original reasons for the use of this instru­
ment centered on Amidon and Flanders discussion (1963* PP« 58-60) of In­
direct and direct .classroom climates. What they found was that the teachers
* See Rosen and D'Andrade (1959); Winterbottom (1969) and Jackson (in 
preparation) for an indirect support of this assumption.
** See Parke (1969) for a review of articles concerning child rearing 
and related topics.
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of students who learned less too often employed a pattern of direct in­
fluence in the classroom, while higher achievement and less dependence
f
was found when goals were clarified by an indirect approach.
Also it was found that a more indirect approach stimulates 
verbal participation by students, which provides the teacher with the 
studentsT perceptions of the situation, regardless of whether these per­
ceptions are correct or incorrect. Such an approach not only provides 
the teacher with more information, but it often results in the students 
developing more responsibility (an inner locus of causation) for diagnos­
ing their difficulties and suggesting a plan of action.
On the other hand and antithetically, a more direct approach 
increases student compliance (external locus of causality) to teacher 
opinion and direction. It conditions students to seek the teacher*s help 
and to check with the teacher more often to be sure they are on the right 
track. A further finding of Amidon and Flanders was that direct teachers 
or teachers who fostered direct environments in their classrooms did not 
use the' social skills of communication that are involved in accepting, 
clarifying and making use of the ideas and feeling of students, whereas 
the indirect teachers did. Teachers using these social skills appropriately 
have less need for giving directions and criticism.
Taken together, the results of this research, according to 
Amidon and Flanders, seem to indicate that higher standards can be achieved 
not by telling students what to do in some sort of "get tough" policy, 
but by asking questions and then using student ideas, perceptions, and re- 
actions to build toward greater self-direction, student responsibility and 
understanding. Such a policy necessitates a genre of teacher that demon-
strates a variability of patterns of behavior in the classroom, which is 
exactly what Amidon and Flanders found the better teachers had, while the 
-poorer teachers showed patterns thatfwere much alike. This suggests, 
concludes the authors, that creative teaching is a unique expression of. 
a particular teacher*s personality using her range of ability and skill 
in working with a particular group of students in a particular subject 
matter field (1963, p. 60).
In discussing the natural ability of children to know what 
they want and to consider those things as that which they most want to 
learn Holt (1964, 1967), Button (1969), and Silberman (1970) assert 
that th£ preferences of children lie close to their actual needs. Each 
new thing they learn makes them aware of other new things to be, learned.
The curiosity of children grows by what it feeds on!
This is the existentialism of the child - the condition of 
real-ness and fulness of functioning, of expanding sensitivity and aware­
ness, of absorbed involvement in issues and work and people, of joy and 
of love - based upon the awareness a child has of himself as a living, 
choosing, self-determining, unique individual. In re cognizing the 
"authentic child" the above authors as well as Drews (1968a, 1968b),
Goodale (l970)>. Hallman (1967; c.f. also: Appendix 1 for a summary of 
factors involved in teaching creatively), Piaget (1970), Rogers (1961), 
and Starkweather (1965) are admitting and encouraging those conditions 
which facilitate creativity or assimilation. The results of such facil­
itations in relation to personality, intellectual and creative development 
of the child are readily demonstrable from studies conducted by Dretfs (1968b), 
Hutchinson (1970), McCormack (1970), Mitchell (1968), Rogers (1961), Rusqh,
15
Denny and Ives (1965), Singer and Rummo (l973)> Starkweather (1971), 
Stoffer (1970), and Wallach and Kogan (1965).
This is neither the place nor the time to describe or summarize 
each one of these studies and their area of research, however, I will, 
very briefly, mention some of them over thenext few pages.
The Goleta Creativity Project (Mitchell, 1968) was designed 
and intended to have teachers explore ways of increasing the creative 
thinking abilities of the elementary school youngsters they taught. This 
end was achieved by giving those teachers involved 'time off from their 
regular teaching assignments which allowed them to visit each other in 
small groups or individually and to discuss teachers r instructional activ- 
ities in terms of aims, methods, and content. Various psychological as­
pects of creativity were explored during the project and an emphasis was 
placed on developing problem-solving skills and divergent thinking, on 
communication, on sensitivity to others (particularily children), and on 
self-evaluation.
Two teachers, at the end of the program, made the following 
evaluations and comments:
"As far as teaching goes, the creativity project 
helped me to become more aware of children and their 
thoughts, feelings, attitudes, etc."
"The big change in my attitude has occurred in my 
feelings toward the role of the teacher in relation 
to the students. I feel that rather than utilizing 
the role of authority bent on teaching only the stated 
areas of the curriculum, I now try to cover a wider 
area and encourage the children to express all their 
ideas as well as seek the right answer."
The implementation. of a philosophy such as that discovered in 
Goleta is readily observable in one study by Rusch, Denny and Ives (1965)
16
and in another by Hutchinson (1970). In the former, four groups of 
sixth grade children were employed, two experimental and two control 
groups. Teachers fostered creativity in the experimental groups by fre­
quently referring to the pupils r success and they also employed failure * 
as a positive learning device. Divergent thinking was encouraged by 
these teachers and they were concerned with creating a climate of mutual 
respect and acceptance. The teachers of the control group employed no 
such creative implementators. The Ss of this study were pre-tested on 
a creativity measure in September and post-tested in June at the end of 
the school year; it was concluded by the researchers that creativity was 
fostered in the experimental group and they based this finding on the 
fact that this group improved, statistically, on 5 of the 7 creativity 
variables measured by the creativity test, whereas the control group did 
not differ in any of these indexes.
The second study by Hutchinson used seventh graders as the sub­
jects. They were divided into the control group which had teachers who 
"used current teaching methods" and an experimental group which, along 
with their teacher, received four days of group instruction in the ex­
perimental procedures and techniques of ideational fluency, originality, 
and planning elaboration - methods to influence and expand creativity. 
Students in the experimental group were informed that they were going 
to be treated as "thinkers". Only four teachers were a pari: of this 
project, all four first taught the control group for a period of three • 
weeks, then they taught the experimental group for the same length of 
time. *
Hutchinson concluded that the mode of instructional methods
17
produced a distinct change in the ratios"of verbal response categories 
which were the measure of creativity which he employed. The experimental 
group had significant gains over the fcontrol group on four of the ten 
measures of creativity with one other measure approaching significance.
In both of these studies, the "creative" teachers helped to 
facilitate environments which could be described as "indirect" or non­
authoritarian, while the control teachers produced an environment which 
could be considered as "direct" or authoritarian. But as previously 
noted, all subjects involved with these studies were from the sixth or 
seventh grades. This experimenter could not find any studies dealing
with an existential approach to the subject of creativity and its rela-
}
tionship to classroom environment which used younger subjects. Although 
Starkweather (1965, 1971) bas investigated creativity with preschool 
children following a philosophy similar to that of Wallach and Kogan, and 
Ward, her research has not been done in relation to classroom environment. 
A study completed by Singer and Rummo (1973) which was mentioned earlier 
studied ideational creativity in kindergarten-age children, but\,theyt 
too did not use different genres of classroom environment as a dependent 
variable. The three classrooms involved in their study were "all non­
authoritarian in their approach, favoring cooperation as a value over 
competition and all classrooms had an air of acceptance of childrens* 
needs and feelings permeating both official policy and teacher-student 
relations" (Singer and Rummo, 1973* P» 155)*
Also only two studies which utilized the approach of Torrance 
with elementary school children younger than sixth graders were found 
(Cartledge and Krauser, 19&3; Liebermann, 1965).
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In addition to the foregoing, Ward*s (1968) tests of creativity,
which were based on the work of Wallach and Kogan, have not, as yet, been
employed in a longitudinal study of creativity. And since conceptually,
it seems that Rogers* theory and that" of DeCharms are very similar in
terms of their mutual emphasis on the importance of creativity, possibly
Plimpton*s (1968) 0-P measure could be utilized as an index of creativity;
I say possibly because it has not been used with children younger than
those who are in the fifth grade (Plimpton, 1968; DeCharms, 1972), nor has
it been directly linked to creativity as yet.
It would be good to mention here that DeCharms, as well as others,
has done research investigating the relationships existing between class-
room environment and Originness. Jackson and Sanders (1973, P- 25*0 mention
that Alsehuler (1968),■Rogers (1969), and DeCharms and Koenigs (1973, in
press) suggest that a democratic classroom climate, and open classroom
structure, and experience-based learning facilitate motivation. These
process-level aspects"of classroom operation actualize democratic/allowing
influence strategy and constitute indirect forms of autonomy-training.
Employing this philosophy and also employing personal causation training
of 6th and 7th grade teachers and having them, in turn, train their pupils
resulted in a longitudinal study supervised by DeCharms (1972) for three
years and demonstrated
"that personal causation training had positive effects 
on the motivated behavior of both teachers and children 
in the schools. Further, at least some of the in­
crease in academic achievement of the students was 
directly related, to change on the Origin variable in­
duced by the training. Practical effects were achiev­
ed and they seem to be related to the theoretical analy- * 
sis of the Origin concept.
(This) research ... produced evidence that the
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central concept - embodied in the Origin variable -
was, in fact, an important mediator of change.*1
(DeCharms, 1972, p. 112)
Because of the absence of research in these specific areas, 
this study will consider the following hypotheses within an existential 
framework and their relevancy to first graders,who, when they enter the 
first grade, are beginning, for the first time, a formal process which 
has very definite influences on their lives:
1) An average increase in creativity will be higher for children 
in indirect or non-authoritarian climates than for children in direct or 
authoritarian climates.
2) An average increase in Originness will be higher for children
}
in indirect or non-authoritarian climates than for children in direct or 
authoritarian climates.
3) Change scores on the 0-P and Creativity Measures will be 
positively associated.
Method
Materials
The indicator of classroom climate developed by Amidon and 
Flanders (1963)* which measures the indirect-direct continuum, was em­
ployed to measure and to determine the atmosphere prevalent in the class­
rooms involved in this study.
The Interaction Analysis, as it is called by Amidon and Flanders, 
is con^osed of 10 categories which are divided into three major 
categories: teacher talk, student talk, and silence or confusion. Teacher 
talk is further subdivided into indirect influence aid direct influence.
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Indirect influence contains four categories: (l) acceptance of feeling,
(2 ) praise or encouragement, (3) acceptance or use of ideas of students, 
and*(10 asking of questions. Direct influence contains: (5) lecturing,
(6) giving directions, and (7 ) criticizing or justification of author­
ity. Student talk is composed of: (8) student talk-responses and 
(9) student initiated talk. Silence or confusion (lo) is a lone cate­
gory that is scored during times of silence or confusion in the 
classroom.
The interaction analysis is constructed by the observer writ­
ing down the category number of the interaction he has just observed 
in the classroom in sequence in a column. The observer notes approximately 
20 interactions per minute or one every three seconds. These numbers 
are then transferred to a matrix and the particular analysis completed 
from the given interactions noted.
In this study, this experimenter was interested in the Indirect- 
Direct Ratio and as such he was mainly interested in teacher talk. The 
I-D ratio then, stems from dividing the total number of indirect inter­
actions (categories 1 - If) by the direct interactions (categories 5-7)* 
Hence, an I-D ratio of 1.0 means that for every indirect statement 
given by the teacher she also gave one direct one; an I-D ratio of 2.0 
means that for every two indirect statements, there was only one direct 
statement, etc.
In conjunction with the I-D ratio, the revised I-D ratio is 
computed in order to find out the kind of emphasis given to motivation 
and control in the classrooms studied. The number of tallies for *
categories 1 - 3 is divided by the number of tallies for categories 6 & 7*
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Categories 1, 2, 3> 6, 7 are more concerned with the actual presen­
tation of subject matter. This ratio eliminates the effects of Categories
^ and 5 (asking questions and lecturing), and gives evidence about whether
1
the teacher is direct or indirect in her approach to motivation and
control - an important point especially as it related directly to DeCharms1
contentions*- mentioned earlier, that the teacher has to provide and foster
indirect motivation and control in the classroom. As with the I-D ratio,
a Revised I-D ratio of 2.0 means that for every direct statement given
by the teacher in relation to motivation and control, she also gives two
indirect statements, etc. (For a more detailed explanation of Interaction
Analysis see Amidon and Flanders, 1963.)
The measure of creativity employed in this study consists of
two forms (Form A and Form B), each of which have three parts (Uses,
Abstract Patterns*, and Instances) Form A and B Uses and Abstract Patterns
were prepared by Ward (RB-71-^0) using items from Wallach and Kogan (1965)
and from Ward (1968). The Uses game involved asking subjects uses for
common objects - (Form A) newspaper,r chair, brick, string, (Form B) shoe,
knife, button, coathanger. The Abstract Patterns game was designed to
elicit possible interpretations for four simple abstract patterns.
According to Ward (KB-71-40, p. U) these two forms were
comparable. However, as far as this experimenter knows, Ward did not
develop two comparable Instances games. In two studies Ward (1969a, 1969b)
did use the Instances game but in the former it consisted of naming instances*
of round things, soft things, and red things. In the latter study the
Instances game asked the subject to name all the instances of round things,
*
things with wheels, and red things. Since Ward employed three cue: , , 
instances with each Instance game, this experimenter decided to use two
* See Figure 1 for drawings of the Abstract Patterns
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of Ward1 s Instances cues with each, form of the Creativity Measure and 
then he "borrowed two other cues from Wallach and Kogan (1965) which 
generated the same number of average <total and unique responses, based 
upon a pilot study (Wood, 1971), as those cues mentioned by Ward. After 
the additions, Instances contained: (Form A) things that make noise, 
round things, and soft things, (Form B) square things, things which have 
wheels, and red things.
A similar, singular form of the above creativity measure has 
been successfully employed in measuring creativity in children as young 
as four years of age (Ward, 1969a).
Two creativity scores were obtained for each child from each
}
test during both the pre and post-testing: fluency (total number of 
ideas given, excluding repetitious responses and responses judged in­
appropriate) and uniqueness (the number of acceptable responses given by 
only one child in the sample).
Even though the 0-P measure (Plimpton, 1968) is standardized 
for use with non-pictorial cues and older children, this experimenter 
believed that if pictorial cues were employed, meaningful protocols 
could be obtained from the first grade subjects. Because TAT cards deal 
with identification or self-expression (Plimpton, 1968, p. 23), which is 
what the written non-pictorial cued protocols with older subjects seek, 
it was decided to employ TAT cards to provide the necessary pictorial 
stimuli for the measure. All together, eight TAT cards were utilised:
1, 5, 8BM, 9BM, 13B, 7GF, 8GF, and 18GF.
Subjects *
During the first phase of this study which was conducted in 
the Spring of 1972, twelve first grade teachers and the children in their
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classrooms formed the population; during the second phase which was con­
ducted during the 1972-1973 school year, six of the original twelve teachers 
were retained in the study and ten children from each one of their class­
rooms formed the population. The twelve classrooms originally involved 
and the s x that participated in the second phase of this study were all 
from schools located in West Omaha.
Procedure
In the Spring of 1972, this experimenter visited the twelve first 
grade classrooms chosen and assessed the climate according to the procedures 
described earlier; however, rather than noting the interactions in the 
class as they were going on, three class sessions for each of the twelve 
classrooms, each approximately 20 minutes in length, were recorded on tape
for :iater'scoring. From these twelve classrooms, six were chosen, 
three from each end of the indirect-direct continuum, to be involved in 
the second phase of this study during the following school year.
The indirect group of teachers were represented by those' individuals 
who have the highest I-D ratio, designated as Classrooms 1, 2, and 3* The 
direct group of teachers were represented by those individuals who had the 
lowest I-D ratio and they were designated Classrooms 1*-, 5, and 6 .
During the Summer, subjects were chosen from the class lists of 
those first grades they would be entering in the Fall* Prior to the begin­
ning of the school year, all sixty children were given the games of 
creativity individually and in an evaluation-free testing context. Fifteen 
boys and fifteen girls received the A form of the creativity measure, and 
fifteen boys and fifteen girls received the B form of the creativity* 
measure on the pre-test. This division of test administration was as
2k
evenly distributed among the six classrooms as possible. The children 
were praised for their responses throughout the task and they continued 
offering ideas until they indicated that they had. no more to give. In 
all instances, the tests were given in the school libraries which pro­
vided a testing envrionment and testing conditions which were generally 
identical from school to school. More detailed procedural instructions 
may be found in Ward (1968; 1969a).
The TAT measure was administered to thirty children, five from
each class; each child was shown five cards. If the subject was a boy, 
he Vas shown 13B, 9BM, 1, 5, and 8EM; if the subject was a girl, she was 
shown ?GF, 18GF, 1, 5, and 8GF. Oyer the thirty subjects, the order of 
presentation was never changed.’ After showing the child the picture, the
following five questions were asked and a specific amount of time was al­
lowed for a response: Would you tell me a story about this picture? (2 
minutes); Tell me again, what is happening, who are the people (who is this 
boy)? (l minute); Tell me again, what has led up to this situation, what 
has just happened? (l minute); Tell me again, what are these people (what 
is this boy) thinking and what do they (does he) want? (l minute); Tell 
me again, what will happen, what will be done? (l minute).
Children taking both the creativity measure and the 0-P measure 
did so in two sessions; during the first one, the former measure was ad­
ministered, while during the second session (several days later), the 
latter measure was administered.
In May of 1973, a post Interaction Analysis was made of the 
classrooms involved in this study. At the same time, the creativity 
measure and the Origin measure were re administered. Those children who
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had taken the A form of the creativity measure on the pre-test were ad­
ministered the B form during the post-testing, while those children who 
had taken the B form on the pre-testj were administered the A form on 
the post-test. The testing conditions during the post-test were as iden­
tical as possible to those existing during the pre-test and as described 
above.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of the Amidon and Flanders Interac­
tion Analysis. Although 12 teachers were originally involved in this 
study, only ten are listed in this table, since one of the original 12
Insert Table 1 about here
teachers left teaching during the course of the study and the tapes from 
the first interaction period of another teacher were unscorable because 
of the constant "confusion” in her room - both the teacher and her aide 
were simultaneously talking much of the time which made an accurate no­
tation and classification of statements impossible.
Classrooms 1-3 are the classrooms designated as indirect classrooms 
and classrooms 4-6 are designated as direct classrooms. The magnitude 
of the I-D ratio served as the criterion for this arrangement. Classrooms 
A-D, as can be seen, had median I-D ratio scores. The Revised I-D ratio 
scores are included because, as was mentioned in the Introduction and 
Materials sections, of their relationship to Originness as an indication
of the amount of motivation created and control fostered in the respective
*
classrooms by the particular teachers.
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The two teachers in the indirect group marked N/A did not want 
a post-measure made of their classrooms.
Table 2 is a master table in« the sense that it presents all the 
raw data accumulated during this study related to the creativity measure. 
The table is broken down by classroom, by type of classroom, by sex, and 
by order of presentation of the two forms (A and B) of the creativity 
measure. Only 54 children were involved in the complete study and the 
analysis of the data accumulated from them is presented in the subsequent 
tables. 5 of bhe original 60 subjects were lost because their families 
moved out of the school district and one changed classrooms during the 
school year.
In scoring the creativity measures, this experimenter, unlike 
Ward (1968) who found an average of 3*9 bizarre or repetitious responses 
with each subject in his study, did not judge any response given by 
a child as bizarre and in only nine instances were repetitious responses 
deleted from this study. However, during the course of the pre-testing 
eleven children indicated to this experimenter that they did not under­
stand a particular question by the genre of responses which they gave^  
for example:
with Instances on Form A, one child gave "spinning around" and 
"windmills" as responses to "Name all of the round things that you can 
think of," and one other child mentioned merry-go-rounds to the same cue. 
Both of these children were confusing round things with things that went 
or had things which went around* Also with Instances on Form A, several 
children gave "glass windows", "glass covered tables", "hardwood fIgors", 
etc., as responses to "Name all of the soft things that you can think of."
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Clearly, the children here were confusing soft things and smooth things.
This confusion was still evident in five of the children during the post­
testing with the same two examples just listed. The deletion of these 
responses from the childrens * Total and Unique scores did not change the 
scores significantly.
The results of a 2 X 2 X 2 (Type of classroom X Order of 
presentation X Sex) analysis of variance of the Total response, change scores 
on the Creativity Measure form the content of Table 3* This analysis was 
computed in order to test the validity of one half of the first hypothesis
Insert Table 3 about here
(in that the Total scores represent one half of the Creativity Measure) 
regarding the type of classroom environment and its relationship to creativ­
ity. The possibility of influences other than classroom climate were also 
tested by this analysis, but significance was obtained only on the type of 
classroom main effect (.025 level). The two remaining main effects (Order of 
presentation and Sex) and all four interactions were not significant at the 
.05 level.
Table k is likewise a listing of the results of a similar 
2 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of the change scores for the Unique responses 
on the Creativity Measure. The reasons for this analysis are similar to 
those justifying the analysis presented in the previous table with the 
one difference being that the Unique scores represent the second half 
of the creativity measure and as such, the second half of the first
Insert Table k about here
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hypothesis. None of the main effects of interactions in this analysis 
were significant at the .05 level, although the type of classroom variable 
approaches significance ( .10> p > .05)f.
The information composing Table 2 is condensed in Table 5 in 
order to further demonstrate that the average child in the indirect class­
rooms increased his Total/Unique score on the creativity measure more than 
did the average child in the direct classrooms: 55*56/28.59 vs. 2 6.19/13*6 .^ 
Also it should be noted that the average child in Room h (a classroom 
classified as direct) increased his Total/Unique score on a level comparable 
with those produced in Rooms l-3> in fact the average Total/Unique score 
for Room ^ (57*^/30.89) is above the average score of the combined indirect 
rooms.
Insert Table 5 about here
To explain further the nature of the significance of Total re­
sponses and the lack of significance of Unique responses found between 
the two types of classrooms, Figure 2 is employed to graph the average pre- 
and post-Total and Unique scores on the creativity measure for combined in­
direct and.combined direct classrooms ignoring sex and order of presentation. 
As can be seen from this figure, initial responding on the pre-test for
Insert Figure 2 about here
both Total number of responses and for Unique responses are very close:
105/32 for the indirect classrooms vs. 110/3^ for the direct classrooms; 
but they clearly diverge on the post-measure: l6o/6l for the indirect
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classroom vs. 137/^6 for the direct classroom.
Data concerning the 28 subjects who were administered the 
creativity measure and the Origin measure is arranged in Table 6. Origin­
ally, 30 subjects were involved with this portion of the study, but 2 
were lost because their families moved out of the school district. Pre-
Insert Table 6 about here
and post-test scores are presented by sex of the subject and by type of 
classroom for the creativity measure and for the Origin measure; however, 
this table is not subdivided by order of presentation of the two forms of 
the creativity measure because this would have rendered the individual 
cells too small for meaningful analysis.
Table 7 shows the results of a 2 X 2 (type of classroom X sex) 
analysis of variance of the Origin change scores. This analysis was under­
taken in order to determine the validity of the second hypothesis which
Insert Table 7 about here
concerned the relationship of classroom environment and the Origin scores 
of those children involved in this portion of the study. The two main 
effects and their interaction were not significant at the .05 level.
Table 8 condenses the data which appears in Table 6 by first 
listing average change score per subject per class ( starting with room 1 
and ending with room 6: 3.2, 1.5, 3*5, b,bj 3*2 ) and then by listing
’ *
Insert Table 8 about here
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average change scores per subject for the indirect vs. direct class­
rooms (2.73 vs. 3*53)* What is noted is that the average change scores 
are small and that the average change score difference existing between
f
the indirect and direct classrooms is .80, which was already noted as 
being nonsignificant at the .05 level.
In viewing Tables 1, 6, 7> and 8 together the suggested influence, 
mentioned earlier, of the Revised I-D ratio on the Origin scores does not 
seem to be particularily valid with the children in this study in that 
there were no significant main or significant interaction effects which 
affected the Origin scores. Also in comparing Table 1 and Table 5> it 
appears impossible to relate the Revised I-D ratio with average change 
scores on the creativity measure in a sensible and meaningful fashion.
To test the relationship between the creativity change scores and 
the Origin change scores (Hypothesis 3 ), two Pearson Product-Moment cor­
relations were computed. The first was between the total change scores 
on the creativity measure and the change scores on the Origin measure for 
each child and the second was between the Unique change scores on the 
creativity measure and the Origin change scores. The former computation 
resulted in a correlation of .0072, while the latter produced a correlation 
of .0113.
Discussion
Hypothesis 1
As hypothesized, the data demonstrates that children in this study 
and in the indirect classrooms did increase their Total score significantly 
more than did those children in the direct classrooms. However, the dif- 
ference between the two groups on the Unique measure was not quite signif­
icant which leads to the conclusion that the first hypothesis was only
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partially substantiated. Some reasons for this finding can be found in 
Table 1 and Table 5« the former Table, the teacher in classroom k 
had an I-D ratio on the post-test th^t would have placed her closer to the 
Indirect group than to the Direct group. Apparently she was doing some­
thing "different" with her class during the post-interaction analysis, and 
presumably she was doing something "different" with her class during the 
school year, that she was not doing with her class during the pre-interaction 
analysis.
In Table 5> the validity of this conclusion seems undeniable. As 
was mentioned in the Results section of this study, the children in class­
room scored, on the average, above the Total/Unique average for the 
combined average of the Indirect classroom group. Unfortunately, this 
finding was not discovered until after the end of the school year so a 
more detailed analysis of this finding is beyond the scope of this.>study.
-However, if classroom ^  is placed within the Indirect group and a 2 X 2 X 2 
analysis of variance, similar to the one described for Table 3> is computed, 
the validity of the first hypothesis, regarding the benefits of an Indirect 
classroom environment on creativity- is completely supported with Total 
responses significant at less than the .001 level and Unique responses 
significant at less than the .05 level.
Hypotheses 2 and 3
The second and third hypotheses, which concerned (2) a higher in­
crease in Origin scores for those children in Indirect classrooms and (3) 
a positive association between creativity and origin change scores, were 
not supported. In this experimenters opinion, age rather than other S 
characteristics or faulty reasoning in the introduction section of this
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appears to be responsible for the failure to find a relationship between 
creativity and Originness. It is possible that a unitary Origin dimension 
cannot be found in children this young.
Children have to be taught to be responsible Origins (DeCharms, 
1969, p. 10) and it may be that the children of this age were not yet cog­
nitively able to understand the distinction between internal and external 
control of behavior. This would be in line with the research on training 
studies presented in Sigel and Hooper’s book (1968) concerning fostering 
conservation in children on Piagetian-type tasks where only those children 
at transition stages were responsive to the training. The transition stage 
research conducted by Turiel (1969), who found that an individual’s level of 
moral development could be increased through training only if he was at a 
transition stage between two stages, indicates a similar effect of cognitive 
readiness on training.° Possibly the children in this study were not as 
yet at the transition stage between knowing and not knowing that "physical 
causation develops out of personal causation" (DeCharms, 1970; P« 26l), and 
hence the actualization of Originness could not be fostered no matter what 
the training conditions.
Prior to his statement concerning physical and personal 
causation quoted above, DeGharms mentions that a similar conceptual rela­
tionship is implicit in Piaget’s discussion of the origin of the child’s con­
ception of causation and DeCharms (1970, P« 260) cites Piaget’s argument as 
presented in Flavell (1963):
Just as with the other special developments, an 
understanding of the development of causality is 
furthered by first having some general notion as to 
where the infant begins and what he is developing 
towards. As to the former, Piaget finds it useful * 
to define two kinds of precausality - like assimilation 
and accommodation, logically distinguishable but 
virtually indissociable in early cognitive function 
ing . .. i The first, efficacy (referred'to as dynamism),
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refers to a dim sense that the inchoate feeling of effort, 
longing, etc., whichsaturate one's actions are somehow 
responsible for external happenings. Efficacy is there­
fore a causality of action-at-a-distance (since presence 
or absence of spatial connection between self as cause 
and event as effect is irrelevant to it) in which the 
cause is vaguely sensed as inhering in one's action with­
out, however, the subject being sufficiently advanced to 
see self and actions as a separate causal agent in the 
universe. The second, phenomenalism, refers to the feel­
ing that temporal (but not necessarily spatial) contiguity 
between any two events means that one caused the other.
It leads to a kind of causal anarchy in which, as Piaget 
puts it, "n'importe quoi produit n'iraporte quoi" (1925, p. 33)- 
Piaget's hypothesis is that the early stages of 
sensory-motor development are characterized by a causality 
best described as an undifferentiated mixture of efficacy 
and phenomenalism. As a knowledge of the evolution of 
space and objects would predict, this early causality 
knows nothing at all of objects as causal eentars acting 
upon each other through spatial contact. With development, 
on the other hand, causality becomes both spatialized and 
objectified, and efficacy and phenomenalism, originally 
undifferentiated, break apart to undergo separate fates. . . 
Efficacy eventually becomes psychological causality, by 
which Piaget means the sense- now in a self aware of its 
thoughts and wishes - of causing one's own actions through 
volition, of willing to perform such and such action before 
performing it. And phenomenalism becomes physical causality, 
the causal action one object exercises on another through 
spatial contact (Flavell, 1963* P« 1^ -2).
Sigel (1964, pp. 232-236) also, in discussing Piaget's concept of 
the development of Causality, states that although children as early as 
the Sensory-Motor period show awareness of eause-effect relationships, an 
objective understanding of the causal nature of events does not blossom 
until late childhood. The explanations given by children prior to achieve-* 
ment of objective causality have been called precausal because they are in­
fused with subjective thinking and based on limited knowledge.
The series of experiments Piaget designed to discover the develop­
mental changes in the child's concepts of psychic and physical phenomena 
axe reviewed elsewhere (Flavell, 1963; Sigel, 196^) but what they
3^demonstrate is that young children have three basic orientations to 
reality (realism, animism and artificialism), each of which is said to 
derive from egocentrism (the initial*lack of differentiation between 
the self and the world). Each of these orientations proceeds toward 
objective reality and causality through a succession of stages, and al­
though the stages for each one are interrelated, they are not perfectly 
synchronized.
Even though Piaget’s (1930) finding on reality and causality can 
be compacted into three stages, here this experimenter is concerned 
only with the second stage, which lasts from two or three to seven or 
eight and is characterized by the child's egocentricity. During this 
stage, the child has no desire to find lbgical justification for his 
statements of belief. The child is precausal and causal concepts accord­
ing to Sigel (196 ,^ p. 23*0 are based on a confusion between psychological 
activity and physical mechanism, and between motive and cause.
Laurendeau and Pinard (1962; cited by Sigel, P« 235) inves­
tigated causal thinking by reviewing studies done by other researchers and 
by undertaking their own program of research. They summarized their re­
sults as follows: Realism disappears at approximately six and a half years 
of age, artificialism around nine, animism and dynamism around ten. Before 
these ages, precausal thinking is preponderant," after these ages the 
opposite is true and possibly this is one reason why Plimpton (1968) and 
DeCharms (1972) sucessfully identified and measured the Origin Syndrome 
in fifth graders.
Hence, precausal explanations decline with age but disappear 
at different rates, depending on the particular types of causal problems.
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Lauren&eau and Pinard*s findings show time lags, since, according to 
Laurendeau and Pinard, "some areas of reality are more easily or rapidly 
objectified than others, according to the complexity of the phenomena, 
the child*s experience, and the formal teaching he has received."
Another finding of the Laurendeau and Pinard study is that 
although experience and knowledge may influence the onset of causal think­
ing stages and the lag in certin areas, the stage progression of causal 
thinking is fixed. In terms of dynamic or efficacious explanations and 
phenomenalistic explanations, the former are not frequent at any age 
but are found occassionally among children of ages eight to sixteen, 
while the frequency of the latter is most prevalent at the age of eight 
and declines steadily up to age fifteen (Sigel, 196k, p, 235). These con­
siderations may constitute another explanation why Plimpton (1968) and 
DeCharms (1972) were successfully able to identify and measure the Origin 
Syndrome in fifth graders, whereas.the results of.the present study were 
not clear.
From the above information and from research not mentioned here,
one can conclude that children do provide different kinds of explanations
for physical and psychical phenomena, that there is a crude correspondence
with age but not a one-to-one relationship, and that the existence of
stages of causal explanations is still a tenable hypothesis.
However, this does not obviate the fact that the child
"must learn not to make what we call "magical" attributions 
to things as if they were people. Human beings, and prob­
ably animals too, know without learning about their own 
simple motives or reasons for acting, and they soon learn 
to act in a way to satisfy these motives, and along the way* 
they learn things are caused because they cause them. If 
a child does not learn to cause things to happen he cannot 
live." (DeCharms, 1968, p. 9 )
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Nor does it disprove the hypothesis that possibly Originness 
does not make its testable appearance until the child has decreased his 
involvement with realism, animism, and artificalism as precausal expla­
nations and increases his reliance on psychological causality and psychical 
causality.
Another factor that may have contributed to the lack of 
validation of the second and third hypotheses of this study may reside in 
the stimulus materials employed as cues for the Origin protocals. As 
mentioned in the Materials Section, TAT cards, prior to this study, have 
not been used as they were here. This may have been one reason explaining 
why many of the children in the study mentioned to this experimenter that 
the drawings were old, that they appeared to be showing scenes from olden 
days, and that it was hard to tell what many of the drawings were actually 
representing. Of the eight TAT cards involved, only 13B escaped these 
comments, possibly because it appears to be of a photographic quality 
rather than a line drawing. With many if not the majority of the children, 
the TAT cards seemed difficult to relate to and their Origin scores may 
have suffered because of this.
In connection with the representation of objects, which is 
what is obtained from stories based on TAT cards, Johnson (1972, p. 93)> 
for instance, has pointed out that the use of more lifelike objects in 
concept experiments improves performance. When line drawings representing 
trees and other familiar objects, for example, varying in form and color, 
were presented to children for matching to a sample, 95 out of 120 pre­
ferred to match on the basis of meaningful representation (Bearison and 
Sigel, 1968). The children in the Bearison and Sigel study were between
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seven and eleven at which age meaning dominates form and color. Also, 
earlier research by Sigel (1953) mentioned by Johnson (1972, p. 93)> in­
dicated that middle class boys of this age would'categorize meaning whether
1
they were categorizing objects, pictures, or words. The.children involved 
in the present study on creativity were all from middle class families.
Even though the just cited research pertains to categorization 
in particular and to children one year older than those; children involved 
in this study, I believe that the dominance of meaning unearthed in these 
experiments is directly transferable to the manner in which objects or 
scenes are represented in general, and here, what medium is employed to 
elicit Origin protocoin in particular. If this is the case, this experi­
menter recommends that future research on Originness with younger children 
be carried out with pictures which match the verbal cues for the short 
story protocols designed by Plimpton (1968).
One last difficulty.incurred during the course of this re­
search necessitates some comment, the use of the Amidon and Flanders 
measure of Classroom Interaction. Both during the pre and post measurements 
of the classrooms involved all teachers mentioned to this experimenter that 
they were having difficulty in organizing a class on different subjects for 
a 10 to 20 minute time period during which the whole class would be in­
volved. Many of the teachers usually had such a class for the purpose 
of this study only during the pre and post taping times. One reason for 
this is that both the pre and post taping sessions were conducted during 
the Spring and in reports from the various teachers in this study, the
children, at this time, worked quite independently and the first 10 or
*
15 minutes each morning was used to pass out assignments and to organize 
activities for the day. After this, the predominant mode of interaction
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the teacher had with the children, exclusive of reading groups,.was a 
one- or two-to-one relationship.
I feel that the Amidon and Flanders Measure was reliable and 
that it did distinguish between the Indirect and Direct teachers but an 
instrument should be designed to assess atmosphere in classrooms where 
the teacher does not carry on prolonged one-to-many interactions with 
her entire class. Possibly, a review and integration of the measures 
developed by Amidon and Flanders (l9^3)> Denny (1968), Harvey et. al. (1966), 
and Schalock et. al. (196*4-) would provide such an instrument.
Implications for Education
The research reported here has many implications for education, 
not only in relation to the finding that the teachers in the Indirect 
group and one in the Direct group were doing something with their classes 
that the two remaining teachers in the Direct group were not doing but 
also the foregoing research has a lot to say about the validity of 
developmental models and the fact that growth is a continually unfolding, 
additive process. Everything does not appear all at once, although this 
may seem to be the reality of aging as perceived by many adults.
One phase of this development is evident in Table 6. Apparently,
Piaget*s period of intuitive thought (age four to seven) is still influential
with those children in this study. Even though a transition to increased
symbolic functioning is taking place during this period, the child is still
egocentric, dominated by his perceptions with his judgements very subjective,
which is not necessarily a bad situation to be in, although often this
*
is the way reality appears to a child because of the feedback he receives 
from teachers, parents, etc.
\
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The phenomenal manifestation of this intuitive period is 
that children are able to handle many kinds of problems intuitively; 
that is, they are able to solve the problems without being able to 
verbalize them. What is suggested by this, mentions Sigel (1964, pp. 242-243)* 
is a need for teaching techniques in which children can work on certain 
problems without necessarily having to provide verbal explanations. Al­
though this may seem contradictory to the proposition that the child's 
Verbalizations facilitates the acquisition of concepts, it would appear 
that there is sometimes reason to limit such emphasis. Assuming that the 
TAT cards.used as cues for the Origin protocols are a valid stimuli, possibly 
the fact that the children in this study were in the intutitve period of 
cognitive development contributed to the results obtained in that the 
children may have intuited a complete story in their mind but did not 
bother to relate it to this experimenter in any more detail than they felt 
was necessary, which in the majority of incidences wan very minimal.
In relation to this, Sigel (1964, p. 243) believes that a 
willingness of the teacher to accept relatively poorly articulated ex­
pressions without negative evaluation may sometimes have a positive effect, 
potentially providing a basis for the child to enhance his intellectual 
development. As mentioned in the Introduction to this study, this is the 
underlying philosophy of Rogers1 theory of education and conjoining-this 
is that question which motivated this research in the first place: how to 
best present the various subject areas to the child in school?
It is here that the existential school, Piaget included, 
stresses the relevancy of the individuals action patterns. Cognitive 
change is made possible by the active interaction of the child and his
ko
surrounding physical and social environment with experience in the class­
room "being no exception. Iri emphasizing the importance of a relevant and 
cogent teaching strategy, Piaget (cited in Sigel and Hooper, 1968, p. kP9) 
mentions that
"Experience is always necessary for intellectual 
development...but I fear that we may fall into the 
illusion that being submitted to an experience (a 
demonstration) is sufficient for a subject to disengage 
the structure involved* But more than this is re­
quired. The subject must be active, must trans­
form things, and find the structure of his own 
actions on the objects.1
It is this cognitive reorganization made available by "self-discovery"
in the classroom which Piaget, along with Dewey and Montessori, Rogers,
Maslow, DeCharms and many others, stresses as a crucial element.
The child must be actively engaged if the learning process
is to be. effective and a. factor which contributes to the success or
failure of such an engagement is whether or not one of the major goals
of schooling is to help children to be personally responsible for their
behavior. For they will never learn inner control as long as. the teacher
maintains strict control within her sphere. Children must be taught to
be responsible Origins. There must be a loosening of the reins by the
teacher if "self-discovery" and intellectual development are to proceed
as they should (DeCharms, 1969, PP* 9-10).
Summary
A theoretical and empirical linking is made between Rogers f
theory of creativity and DeCharms Origin Syndrome. To directly test this
*
linking, 60 children from six first grade classrooms were involved ina 
year long study which investigated the relationships between classroom
kl
environment and creativity, the relationship "between classroom environment 
and the Origin Syndrome, and the possibility of a positive relationship 
between creativity and Originness. *
It was concluded that there is a significant partial effect 
on creativity due to classroom environment: indirect or non-authoritarian 
classrooms foster creativity, whereas direct or authoritarian classrooms 
hinder creativity. No significant change s001*6 was noted for the Origin 
Syndrome however, and no positive relationship between creativity and 
Originness was demonstrated.
Possible reasons as to why the above results were obtained 
are discussed and several recommendations are listed for future research.
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Table 1
Pre I-D and Revised I-D Ratio Scores for the Original 
10 Classrooms and Post I-D and Revised I-D Ratio Scores 
for the Six Classrooms which were a Part of the Complete Study*
I-D Ratio Revised I-D Ratio
Pre Post Pre Post
Classroom 1 3-09 3-21 5.39 3-21
Classroom 2 2 .6 0 2.11 3.37 6.09
Classroom 3 l.k6 2.45 1.48 11.33
Classroom A 1.22 1.18
Classroom B 1.04 1.10
Classroom C .9 6 1.36
Classroom D • 91 1.63
Classroom 4 .74 1.89 1.64 2.05
Classroom 5 • 70 n/a 1.22 n/a
Classroom 6 .66 n/a l.4o n/a
* Classrooms 1-3 are indirect classrooms
Classrooms A-D are the ones dropped from this study 
Classrooms 4-6 are direct classrooms
Table 2
Total/Unique Number of Responses for Indirect 
Classrooms and Direct Classrooms on Creativity Measure*
Boys Girls
Pre (A) Post (b ) Pre (B) Post (A) Pre (a ) Post (B) Pre (B) Post (Z
t/u t/u t/u t/u t/u t/u t/u t/u
Room 1
(n » 9 )
77/23
111/18
95/ 21+
221/73
119/23
102/29
100/26
272/166
117/35
101+A6
H+3/39
97 /25
119/31+
201+/72
59/10
118/1+1
39/7
191+/83
Room 2 
(n = 9 )
127A 9
75/32
U 3/52
180/1+3
259/82
169/65
128/60
106/1+1
171/97
99/35
11+9/61
96/39
201/89
183/55
81 /9
91/20
82 /3 0
106/33
Room 3 
(n=9 )
113/31
101/35
161/36
225/105
101/37
101/22
11+1+/66
151/67
119/1+2
122/ 1+7
106/38
170/51
187/62
21+9/89
91/25
72 /12
115 /60
11+9/66
Room J-l-
(n-9 )
137/55
189/69
9 6 /2 8
198/89
211+ /101+
222 /70
63 /9
97/18
125/52
109/35
119/1+6
103/36
199/79
159/31+
127/1+2
155/ 1+3
162/76
215/85
Room 5 
(a=8 )
162/59
90/32
U l/2 3
188/80
173/75
113/21
93/31
89/30
92 /27
136/78
1+9 /18 73 /15 96/25
92/ 21+
107/1+8
133/ 1+0
Room 6 
(n= 10 )
100/ 2l+ 
131A 6 
96/29 
129/56
96 /26
126/27
8 0 / ll
151/1+8
121/ 1+2 109/38 113/ 1+2
136/38
112/1+2
101+/23
112/30
8 8 /2 3
106/28
96/1+1
9V 33
81+ /21+
* see Table 1 for type of classroom
bk
Table 3
Analysis of Total Responses from the Creativity Measure
Source SS df MS f
Total 1261*6 6 .2 0 53
I-D 12757.^0 1 12757.1*0 5.76*
Order 621*0 .0 2 1 621*0 .0 2 2 .8 2
Sex 2292.81* 1 2292.81* I .03
I-D X Sex 151*6 . 1*6 1 151*6 .1*6 • 70
I-D X Order * li*l*6 .70 1 11*1*6 .7 0 .65
Order X Sex -668.90 1 -668.90 -.30
I-D X Order X Sex 926.1*0 1 9 26.1*0 .1*2
Error 101925.28 1*6 2215.80
* p <5.025
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Table 4
Analysis of Unique Responses from the Creativity Measure
^ Source SS df MS f
Total 40019.o4 53
I-D 2507.85 1 2507.85 3*40
Order 1949-45 1 1949.45 2 .65
Sex 765.58 1 765.58 1.04
I-D X Sex 514.43 1 514.43 .70
I-D X Order 41.22 1 41.22 .06
Order X Sex 307.00 1 307.00 .42
I-D X Order X Sex 46.60 1 46.60 .06
Error 33886.91 46 736.67
*
k6
Table 5
Change in Number of Total/Unique Responses Averaged per Child and 
per Classroom from Pretesting to Posttesting on the Creativity
Measure*
Average Change Score, 
per Subject per Class
Average Change Score per 
Subject for Sub-Groups I-D
Room 1 li-7.il/27.11
Room 2 53.78/23.89 55.56/28 .59
Room 3 6 9.1)4 /31)-.78
Room ^ 57.44/30.89
Room 5 2 9.13/1 5 .3 8 2 6.19/13.64
Room 6 -8 .OO/-5 .3 3
* see Table 1 for type of classroom
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Table 6
Pre and Post Scores for Creativity Measure (Total/Unique) and 
Originness Measure for Indirect and Direct Classrooms*
Boys Girls
Pre Post Pre Post
Crea 0 Crea 0 Crea 0 Crea 0
Room 1 77/25 5 95/24 10 H7/35 2 97/25 8
(n 5 ) 1 1 1 /1 8 0 221/73 4 . 143/39 0 204/72 4
; '99/10 3 39/7 0
Room 2 75/32 1* 259/82 7 96/39 4 183/55 3
(a h) 81/9 0 82 /3 0 3
91 /20 0 106/33 1
Room 3 113/31 3 161/36 8 119/42 1 170/51 5
(n 5) 101/37 7 144/66 7 91/25 4 115/60 8
72 /12 6 149/66 7
Room ^ 137/55 4 198/89 6 119/46 4 199/79 10
(n 5) 189/69 1 214/104 7 127/42 1 162/76 6
97/18 1 109/35 4
Room 5 162/59 1 188/80 2 96/25 3 107/48 6
(n 4) 11 1 /23 1 113/21 1
93/31 0 92/27 8
Room 6 100/21* 2 96 /26 4 136/38 0 104/23 2
(n 5) 96/29 0 80/11 3 112/30 1 96/41 2
131/1*6 2 126/27 10
* see Table 1 for type of classroom
Table 7 
Analysis of Origin Scores
Source SS df MS f
Total 186.68 27
I-D 8.04 1 8.04 .84
Sex 6.04 1 6.04 1 .1 1
. I-D X Sex -0 .6 8 1 -0 .6 8 -0 .0 9
Error 173*29 24 7 .2 2
Table 8
Change Scores Averaged per Child and per Classroom 
on the Origin Measure*
Average Change Score Average Change Score per 
per Subject per Class Subject for Sub-Groups I-D
Room 1 3*2
Room 2 1*5 2.73
Room 3 3-5
. Room 4 4.4
Room 5 3.0 3-53
Room 6 3.2
* see Table 1 for type of classroom
Fig. 1. Drawings of Abstract Patterns 
Top four patterns are from Form A 
Bottom four patterns are from Form B
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l60- I Total
150-
D Total
120-
110-
100-
I Unique
55-
D Unique
35-
25-
Pre Post- Origin Scores -
Fig. 2. Average Pre and Post Total and 
Unique Scores per Subject on the Creativity Measure*
* see Tables 3 - 5 *
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Appendix 1 
Techniques of Creative Teaching*
Obstacles to Creativity: t
1) the pressure to conform,
2) authoritarian attitudes and environments repress the creative 
potential of young people,
3) ridicule and similar attitudes destroy feelings of self-worth 
in students and therefore have a tendency to block off creative efforts,
those traits which make for rigidity of personality inhibit 
creative expressions,
5) an over-emphasis on such rewands as grades arouses defensive 
attitudes on the part of pupils and to that extent threatens inventiveness,
6) an excessive quest for certainity stills the creative urge,
7) an over-emphasis on success drains off energies from creative 
processes and focuses them upon outcomes, perhaps upon some status symbol, 
or on the merely instrumentally valuable goals which might have been 
achieved,
8) hostility toward the divergent personality, either on the 
part of teachers or peers, may serve as a cultural block; every creative 
act is unique, idiosyncratic, nonconforming, and often curiously onesided,
9) an intolerance of the "play" attitude in connection with 
school work characterizes the environments which stifle creativeness; in- 
novation requires freedom to toy with ideas and materials, encouragement to 
deal with irrelevaneies, and permission to dip into fantasy and make- 
believe . ,
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Aids to Creative Teaching:
1) the creative teacher provides for self-initiated learning on 
the part of the pupils; t
2) the creative teacher sets up nonauthoritarian learning en­
vironments. Conditions of freedom facilitate creatieness. The kind 
of freedom which is requisite to creativity is psychological freedom, 
symbolic freedom, the freedom experienced in a spontaneous expression and 
not an overt, aggressive freedom, not license;
3) the creative teacher encourages pupils to over-leam; to 
saturate themselves with information, imagery, and meaning;
1+) the creative teacher encourages creative thought processes.
She stimulates pupils to seek for new connections among data, to associate, 
imagine, think up tenative solutions to problems at hand, ! ake wild guesses, 
hitchhike ideas, build on the ideas of others and to point these ideas in 
new directions;
5)ithe creative teacher defers judgement. She does not block
off an exploratory effort by announcing outcomes or by providing solutions;
6) the creative teacher promotes intellectual flexibility among 
the students;
7 ) the creative teacher encourages self-evaluation of individual 
progress and achievement. She rejects group norms and standarized tests 
on the grounds that they are both inappropriate and harmful to creative 
learning;
8) the creative teacher helps the student to become a more 
sensitive person - to become more sensitive to the moods and feelings of 
other people, to all external stimuli, to social and personal problems;
5^to academic ones, to public issues, and even to the commonplace and 
the unknown;
9) the creative teacher knows how to make use of the question;
10) the creative teacher provides opportunities or students to 
manipulate materials, ideas, concepts, tools and structures;
11) the creative teacher urges pupils to consider problems as 
wholes, to emphasize total structure rather than the piecemeal., additive 
elements.
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